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Abstract
Bitcoin [1] is the first successful decentralized global digital cash system. Its mining process requires
intense computational resources, therefore its usefulness remains a disputable topic. We aim to solve
three problems with Bitcoin and other blockchain systems of today by repurposing their work. First,
space to store a blockchain is growing linearly with number of transactions. Second, a honest node is
forced to be irrational regarding storing full blocks by a way implementations are done. Third, a trustless
bootstrapping process for a new node involves downloading and processing all the transactions ever
written into a blockchain.
In this paper we present a new consensus protocol for Bitcoin-like peer-to-peer systems where a right
to generate a block is given to a party providing non-interactive proofs of storing a subset of the past
state snapshots. Unlike the blockchain systems in use today, a network using our protocol is safe if the
nodes prune full blocks not needed for mining.
We extend the GKL model [2] to describe our Proof-of-Work scheme and a transactional model
modifications needed for it. We provide a detailed analysis of our protocol and proofs of its security.
1. Introduction
The Bitcoin whitepaper [1] defines a way a common ledger could be maintained within a trustless peer-to-peer
network by using moderately hard computational puzzles [3] and the blockchain datastructure. Since then a lot of
research has been done about Bitcoin and alternative systems. Nevertheless, there are still many open problems in
the field, and performance is one of the most crucial [4]. Another threat to the blockchain-based systems of today
is the lack of reward for any activity supporting the network other than the block generator self-election via finding
a partial hash collision. In particular, there is no reason for the nodes in the network to store all the blocks since
the genesis until the few newer ones. On other side, it is not known how to build a safe network if its participants
are going to be rational about storing the full blocks.
In this paper we present a consensus protocol alternative to the Proof-of-Work used in Bitcoin. In our protocol a
participant is rewarded for archiving few state snapshots amongst n states a network aims to store collectively. That
is, if a miner is storing a state snapshot for height h1, then when a new block appears she will need to replace the
snapshot with a new one corresponding to height h+ 1. Thus a miner needs to store some number of full blocks
also.
1.1. The Consensus and the Mining Lottery
The Bitcoin blockchain is generated in a worldwide peer-to-peer network without any central authority. In such
an environment, the next block determination process requires a protection against Sybil attacks [5].
The Proof-of-Work mining process [1] eliminates Sybil attacks and also enforces a rational miner to choose a
single version of the history out of possible options.
The Proof-of-Work mining process could be seen as a lottery as described in [6]. A mining software iterates
over changeable block field values until it finds a solution, that is, a block whose header satisfies the predicate:
hash(blockheader) < difficulty2, where difficulty is a publicly known value. The iterations could not be
precomputed because of the epoch-dependent3 unique value which is known to all the participants and stored
into a blockheader.
1.2. The Blockchain Storing Rationale
In the Bitcoin Core, the reference implementation of the Bitcoin protocol [7], a node stores all the blocks with
all the transactions since the genesis block. In addition, the current state snapshot is also stored in the form of
unspent transaction outputs set.
1. Here we use the regular meaning for the word height, that is it is the number of blocks of the blockchain from its genesis to the given
block
2. In general “hash” means a cryptographic hash function, whereas “difficulty” is defined analogously as in the Bitcoin protocol jargon.
3. Here, as in [6], we consider the epoch as the interval between the discovery of blocks.
The main benefit for the network in storing all the full blocks is that the new nodes have to download them since
the genesis and re-validate all the transactions ever included in the blocks. Therefore, in order for the blockchain
holder to be useful for the network, i.e., perform an altruistic activity, it has to store all the full blocks.
A rational participant can still have all the full node merits without keeping all the blocks except the last few
ones which are needed to handle possible forks (a probability for a blockchain suffix to be reversed is going down
exponentially with a suffix length). To be rational it is needed to switch to an implementation of the Bitcoin protocol
which does not hold the unnecessary data (such an implementation of a full node does not exist to the best of our
knowledge).
However, if all the nodes in the network are rational, tragedy of commons [8] happens: nobody is storing full
blocks except last few ones. The only way to get into the network then is to download the current state snapshot
and trust it.
1.3. The Motivation For a New Protocol
Next, we detail the four main points which our protocol addresses.
1.3.1. Incentives to Keep a Full Node. The only rewarded activity in Bitcoin is the iteration over values for certain
fields in a block header. If mining software includes transactions into the block, it needs to validate them, which
can be carried by presenting the current state snapshot. Storing any number of full blocks is not needed in order
to mine. Our particular goal is to develop a protocol providing incentives to run a node storing sufficiently enough
number of full blocks for network viability, thus making the network safer in the long run.
1.3.2. Solving The Blockchain Storing Rationale Problem. As the growth of a blockchain is not bounded, in the
long run the network can survive only if storage and processing power of an ordinary computer grows not slower
than requirements of a blockchain system. Storing enough blocks is the activity with no reward, so eventually most
of the full nodes will purge blocks from their disks except the last ones having non-negligible probability to be
rolled back. This means a system where blocks are needed but not stored due to a practical impossibility. Our
protocol rewards the collectively storage of number of blocks sufficiently enough for network safety.
1.3.3. A Prunable Blockchain. A solution to the storing rationale problem would be a protocol for which an
archive of some number of blocks and states are required in order to mine new blocks. This number n could be
sufficiently large to assume any rollback caused by a fork could be of negligible depth in comparison with it. For
example, n = 10, 000 blocks gives approximately 70 days of history to be stored if a block is generated every 10
minutes on average. Any rollback possible is of negligible depth in comparison with that.
In such a system we can assume that the overwhelming majority of the nodes (except tracking tools and other
special applications) to be rational so to remove blocks not needed for mining having a freedom of choice given.
A rational node has predictable storage resources consumption. A network of rational nodes is also sending less
blocks, and bandwidth being saved could be repurposed for other tasks improving overall system performance.
1.3.4. Fast Trustless Bootstrap. A new full node in Bitcoin needs to download and process all the blocks since the
genesis block. This results into an unreasonably long and resource-consumptive initial processing phase. In order to
reduce the burn of this phase, a trusted Bitcoin state snapshot generated by a notable community member could be
downloaded [9]. This approach reinstates trust-related issues solved by Bitcoin. We want to provide fast, trustless
and safe bootstrapping with the help of our consensus protocol.
1.4. The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol
There are few models describing Bitcoin consensus protocols. Simpler ones from [3], [6] introduce a notion
of a ticket, which is the one iteration of a Proof-of-Work function. Comprehensive GKL model from [2] derives
properties of the Bitcoin protocol as well as ledgers built on top of it while not using a notion of ticket. We will
use the latter work to reason about our protocol.
The GKL model (also the Bitcoin Backbone protocol) relies on the standard choice for the description of
distributed models [10] which we now describe.
Every party P in the network is modeled as an Interactive Turing Machine (ITM) which has access to two
tapes named INPUT () and RECEIV E(), the input and communication tapes. The interaction of the parties are
controlled by the environment entity Z: an ITM which provides the contents of the INPUT () tape of each party.
It also defines the rounds of the system. At each round the parties are allowed to write and read from its tapes
as well as perform computation. We also assume the existence of an operation BROADCAST which allows the
parties to send messages atomically to all other parties. Furthermore, each party is allowed to execute at most q
hash queries to a regular cryptographic hash function denoted by hash.
The adversarial and messaging framework. The adversary A is also an ITM. We assume it is “adaptive”
which means it can corrupt honest parties Pi which are performing the protocol, say Π. It also has access to at
most q queries to the hash function, however which can be added to the queries from the corrupted parties.
The messages exchanged between the parties Pi can be intercepted by A. Moreover, the adversary can change
the origin of the message, however it cannot delay the delivery of it nor change its contents (exception is the origin,
as stated earlier). Hence the model guarantees the delivery of the messages on the next round. In other words, there
is no delay on the delivery of the messages. This feature characterizes the model as synchronous, as opposite to
the asynchronous model when the adversary can add a delay on the delivery of messages. Given the upper bound
q hash queries for each party, we denote the model q-bounded synchronous model.
The Execution of Π. The execution of the protocol Π is captured by the view of the environment Z is denoted
by VIEWΠ,A,Z(k, q, z) which is the concatenation of the views of each Pi performing the protocol Π. That is p
random variable ensembles4 {VIEWPiΠ,A,Z(k, q, z)}k∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ , for the security parameter k and auxiliary input z.
For a concrete ledger to be cast into the GKL Model it is necessary to provide a construction for three functions.
They are:
• Content Validation Predicate V (·)
• Chain Reading Function R(·)
• Input Contribution Function I(·)
We will define the three functions to some degree needed for our Proof-of-Work scheme. Then concrete blockchain
system (Bitcoin, Namecoin, Ethereum and so on) can extend our definitions to complete its design.
1.5. Rollerchain
We shape some properties of ledger semantics and Proof-of-Work scheme built with respect to them. The
framework allows to achieve goals claimed in the section 1.3 via rewarding miners to store collectively a rolling
window of state snapshots and full blocks (thus the name Rollerchain).
2. Transactional Model
Our consensus protocol requires for a ledger with some properties. In order to formally define the properties we
are extending the Bitcoin backbone protocol described in general in section 1.4. Unlike Bitcoin, we are adding an
authenticating value for a whole state to a block. There are discussions in the Bitcoin community about implementing
that (the earliest found discussion was started by Andrew Miller back in 2012 [11]), but no concrete plans exist at
the moment to the best of our knowledge.
2.1. The Blockchain and The State
A blockchain could be seen as a linked list where an element (a block) is a tuple (∆Si,∆Ci), where ∆Si is a
transactional state modifier and ∆Ci is a consensus state modifier. The tuple of state modifiers could be applied
to a state which results another state whenever the modifiers are valid. We denote a state modifier application
by ⋄, then (Si, Ci) = (Si−1, Ci−1) ⋄ (∆Si,∆Ci). Every network participant knows the predefined transactional
and consensus state (S1, C1) resulted from the genesis block. Then each participant knows exactly the same state
(Si, Ci) = (((S1, C1) ⋄ (∆S2,∆C2)) ⋄ · · · ⋄ (∆Si,∆Ci)) if all the blocks are the same. The order of modifiers is
defined via immutable link from each modifier to the previous one, where the first modifier in the history must be
linked to the genesis state. For a block (∆Si,∆Ci) we denote by i the value for the height of the block.
4. Here we consider an unknown, for the parties, number of p participants, where p is a fixed value.
The consensus state modifier changes the rules on the block validation which are not related to the transactions
stored in it (for example, it contains the difficulty value which is explained in the next sections). A transactional
state modifier being, atomic in terms of its application, itself contains a sequence of transactions. Furthermore,
given the height i, we denote by state snapshot or just state the transactional state Si.
2.2. The Fixed State Representation
A state representation is not fixed by the Bitcoin protocol. A full node implementation usually stores a set of
unspent outputs and also some node-specific additional information. By applying valid transactions from a new
block, a node software takes unspent outputs out of the set and puts there outputs from the transactions in the new
block [1].
Abstracting the Bitcoin-like model, a state could be represented as a set of closed boxes of size nS . Each box
has a value associated with it. A transaction contains openers for nk boxes and also creates nb new closed boxes.
The resulting state set has the size of nS − nk + nb after applying the transaction to it.
Each box has some unique identifier id(box) thus the state could be represented as dictionary (id(box) → box).
We require the dictionary to be authenticated and corresponding one-way digest to be included into a blockheader.
Note that our construction of a state representation is fixed and is a part of the protocol, unlike Bitcoin.
We use the term box and not output because the latter is used not in all the blockchain systems. For example,
Ethereum [12] is using notion of mutable accounts instead of immutable outputs, but we still can get a box from
an account and its state in order to build an explicit state using boxes.
2.3. An Authenticated Dictionary
We represent the state in the form of id(box) → box correspondences, and an authenticated dictionary [13],
[14] is to be built upon them. Different authenticated dictionary implementations are known: sparse Merkle
trees [15], treaps [16], skiplists [17], balanced trees [13], tuple-based solutions [16]. We do not specify a concrete
implementation for an authenticated dictionary but require the following properties to be hold:
• Root authenticator. A single fixed-size value commits the entire dictionary.
• Set-uniqueness. A dictionary with given set of keys has a unique and canonical representation.
• Efficiency. The proof returned for a lookup request should be has a size sublinear to dictionary size.
• Non-membership proofs mentioning set member ids. Our protocol will generate uniform ids so in most
cases it will be no element in the set with a key given. Thus we need for proofs of non-membership. As we
are going to include a box into a blockheader, we require a non-membership proof to mention a member id
or ids. We assume there is a function member(pi) which extracts in a deterministic way an id of a member
of the dictionary from a proof, whether it is a proof of membership or a proof of non-membership.
An authenticated dictionary must provide a support for following operations:
• root(D) calculates an authenticating value for a dictionary D.
• checkRoot(D, aD) checks whether aD is a correct authenticating value for a dictionary D.
• generate(D, i)
.
generates a proof pi of (non-) membership for an identifier id and dictionary D.
• checkPath(D, id, pi) checks whether a proof pi is valid for an identifier id and dictionary D.
• member(D, pi) returns deterministically defined element presenting in dictionary D given a proof of (non-
) membership pi.
Note we define operation for a dictionary D, but it also possible to use a set of uniquely identifiable objects
instead in an every operation. In this case we first extract an identifier for each object getting a dictionary as a
result of this transformation, then we apply an operation to the dictionary. For example, we will write root(τ),
where τ is a set of transactions minding the transformation to be done before the operation.
2.4. Block Header
Our idea to reduce storage requirements based on a notion of a block header:
Definition 1. A block header contains parts of a block enough to check its authenticity and whether a valid amount
of work has been spent to generate it. In Rollerchain, block header is 〈s, t, root(S), root(τ)〉.
In order to build a safe system we need full nodes to store all the block headers since genesis, thus the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. Throughout the paper we assume a rational full node can tolerate storing all the block headers
since genesis. In the same time it prunes full blocks not needed for selfish purposes anymore to just block headers.
We argue the assumption is reasonable. As of August, 2016, a block header in Bitcoin is about just 80 bytes
while a full block is about 1 megabyte. For 1 million block headers (about 19 years of Bitcoin history), block
headers fit into 80 megabytes while full blocks will consume 1 terabyte of disk space.
2.5. Refined Transactional Ledger Model
The protocol parties, called miners, process sequences of transactions τ = tx1 . . . txe. A transaction contains
identifiers of boxes to remove from a state along with openers and boxes to append: tx = 〈(id(boxr1) →
opener1, . . . , id(boxrk)→ openerk), (id(boxa1) → boxa1 , . . . , id(boxaj )→ boxaj )〉. A transaction is valid against
a state which is a set of boxes if it removes boxes presenting in the state with valid openers and append boxes
not presenting in the state. Transactions as well a state after applying them are supposed to be incorporated into
their local chain C. The input inserted at each block of the chain C is the whole state along with its integrity proof
aS = root(S) and transactions along with the integrity proof for them aτ = root(τ) (S, aS , τ, aτ ). Thus, a chain
C contains the vector xC = 〈(S1, aS1 , τ1, aτ1), . . . , (Sm, aSm , τm, aτm)〉.
Next, we define functions V alidateBlock (to check validity of aS , τ, aτ values from a block against a state Sp
previous to the block) and ⋄ (to apply a set of transactions τ to a state S getting an updated state as result).
Algorithm 1 Block validation function, parametrized with constant block reward value constReward
1: function VALIDATEBLOCK( Sp, aS , τ , aτ )
2: if τ is empty then return false
3: end if
4: txcoinbase ← head(τ)
5: if txcoinbase creates more than 1 box or opens any box then return false
6: end if
7: boxcoinbase ← the only box of txcoinbase
8: valuecoinbase ← value of boxcoinbase
9: feetotal ← 0
10: boxesnew ← [boxcoinbase]
11: S′ ← Sp
12: for each transaction tx in tail(τ) do
13: feetx ← 0
14: for each box to remove boxr and its opener in tx do
15: if a a box with identifier id(boxr) is not in S ′ or opener invalid then return false
16: end if
17: feetx ← feetx− value of boxr
18: remove boxr from S ′
19: end for
20: feetx ← feetx+ sum of values of new boxes in tx
21: if feetx < 0 then return false
22: end if
23: feetotal := feetotal + feetx
24: add new boxes from tx to boxesnew
25: end for
26: if valuecoinbase 6= feetotal + constReward then return false
27: end if
28: add boxesnew to S ′
29: return checkRoot(S ′, aS) ∧ checkRoot(τ, aτ )
30: end function
Algorithm 2 Block application function ⋄.
1: function ⋄ ( S, τ )
2: S ′ ← S
3: for each transaction t in τ do
4: for each id(boxr) in t do
5: Remove boxr from S ′
6: end for
7: for each boxa in t do
8: Append boxa to S ′
9: end for
10: end for
11: return S ′
12: end function
With the help of the functions defined previously we can now describe semantics of V (·), I(·), R(·) functions of
the GKL model defined in the section 1.4.
Table 1. Box operations log protocol, built on the Bitcoin backbone.
Content validation predicate V (·) V (〈x1, ..., xm〉) is true if and only if for every xi = (aSi , τi, aτi ), i >
1, V alidateBlock(Si−1, aSi , τi, aτi ) = true, Si = Si−1 ⋄ τi, and S1 is known
valid genesis state.
Chain reading function R(·) If V (〈x1, ..., xm〉) = True, the value R(C) is equal to 〈x1, ..., xm〉; undefined
otherwise.
Input contribution function I(·) I(C, round, Input()) operates in the following way: if the input tape contains
(Insert, v), it parses v as a sequence of transactions and retains the largest subsequence
τ  v that is valid with respect to the current state Sc from a last block in C, and then
S = Sc ⋄ τ, x = (root(S), τ, root(τ)).
A concrete blockchain system to be built on top of the Rollerchain needs to specify box semantics and
authenticated dictionary implementation.
3. The Protocol
Our protocol is designed to create an incentive for the miners to store collectively the last n states and blocks,
where each miner stores at least k states and also k·n
k+1 blocks on average in order to generate a block. Before
detailing our construction, it is convenient to introduce the notation that will be used from this point.
3.1. The Notation
We denote by hash a regular cryptographic hash function with a uniformly distributed output. Furthermore, given
two strings z and w we denote by z||w the string which results from the concatenation of z and w.
We assume that the mining rewards could be given to an owner of a public key pk. Furthermore, we assume the
existence of a signature scheme and every party owns a public key pk.
Function last(C) returns last generated block from a chain C.
3.2. The Setup
Consider a party wants to be a miner. In the first place she is generating her public key pk and choosing state
snapshots to store based on the public key. The set of states is defined by the function ChooseSnapshots defined
below.
Algorithm 3 Snapshots extraction function ChooseSnapshots.
1: function CHOOSESNAPSHOTS ( C, pk )
2: hc ← length of C
3: Spk ← []
4: for each i in 1 . . . k do
h← (hash(pk||i) mod n) + (hc − n)
5: add state corresponding to block C[h] to Spk if h > 0, genesis state otherwise (it could happen if hc < n)
6: end for
7: return Spk
8: end function
All the Spk values must be unique, otherwise no valid block could be generated. We enforce such a requirement
to prevent malicious iteration over the public key space to find as much repeating states as possible. Thus it is not
possible to mine with any public key. When a new block at height hc+1 arrives, Alice needs to recalculate at least
k states. Thus Alice must store blocks since minimal height of Spk also.
[TODO: draw pic]
3.3. The Ticket Generation
Next, we describe a process of generating an object from k state snapshots defined by the ChooseSnapshots
function we name a ticket following the Permacoin paper [6]. Ticket consists of k boxes (one from each of the
states) along with proofs against state authenticating values. The function GenT icket to generate a ticket is getting
current blockchain C, miner’s public key pk, unpredictable seed value st and a nonce ctr to be increased on an
each call with the same (C, st, pk) values.
Algorithm 4 Ticket generation function GenT icket.
1: function GENTICKET ( C, st, pk, ctr )
2: seed← ctr
3: S[1 . . . k]← ChooseSnapshots(C, pk)
4: for each i in 1 . . . k do
5: idi ← hash(seed||pk||st)
6: pii ← generate(Si, idi)
7: boxi ← member(Si, pii)
8: aSi ← root(Si)
9: seed← idi
10: end for
11: t← 〈(pk → ctr), ∀i ∈ 1 . . . k, (idi → (aSi , pii, boxi)〉
12: at = root(t)
13: return at → t
14: end function
3.4. Proof-of-Work Function
We modify the Proof-of-Work function of the GKL model [2] by using GenT icket function defined above, and
also we are explicitly adding miner’s public key pk as an argument of the Proof-of-Work function.
Algorithm 5 Rollerchain’s Proof-of-Work function, parametrized by q,D. The input is (x; C; pk).
1: function ROLLERPOW(x, C, pk)
2: 〈aτ , aS , τ〉 ← x
3: if C = ε then
4: s← 0
5: else
6: 〈s′, at′, a′τ , a
′
S , ctr
′〉 ← head(C)
7: s← hash(ctr′, hash(s′, t′, a′τ , a
′
S)
8: end if
9: ctr← 1
10: B ← ε
11: while (ctr ≤ q) do
12: st ← hash(s||aS ||aτ )
13: 〈at, t〉 ← GenT icket(C, st, pk, ctr)
14: h← hash(s, at, aτ , aS)
15: if hash(ctr, h) < D then
16: B ← 〈s, t, x, ctr〉
17: break
18: end if
19: ctr ← ctr + 1
20: end while
21: C ← CB
22: return C
23: end function
Note, in line 12 we are generating a seed value for a GenT icket procedure as hash(s||aS ||aτ ). It is made to
avoid an optimization when a miner could generate a ticket once and then iterate over aτ and aS .
3.5. Protocol Notes
With our consensus protocol, block header becomes 〈s, at, aτ , aS , ctr〉, a full block consists of a block header
plus full ticket t and transaction set τ .
In order to check block validity one needs, in addition to all the checks described before in this paper, one
needs to replay GenT icket() code with boxes and proofs of their authenticity given and checkPath() instead of
generate() and then member().
4. Discussion of The Protocol
In this section we analyze the properties of our protocol and also relate our construction with potential issues.
4.1. The Bootstrapping Process
In blockchain systems of today, a bootstrapping process for a new full node is as follows:
1) A node knows genesis state.
2) A node downloads all the full blocks and apply them.
We propose to use following light bootstrapping algorithm instead of the classic one:
1) A node knows genesis state.
2) A node downloads block headers, check a chain Proof-of-Work validity.
3) A node asks peers for available states.
4) A node downloads a state S〉 for the height i from available options.
5) A node downloads full blocks since i and apply them.
Bitcoin at this moment has about 40 million unspent outputs and 160 million transactions, and a size of an
output is by an order of magnitude smaller than a size of transaction. Thus the light bootstrapping allows to reduce
network traffic during downloading chain prefix without transactions and also eliminate transactions validation. The
latter now takes tens of hours on commodity hardware.
4.2. Security Analysis
There are two key questions about the security of the proposal we need to answer. In the first place, how different
is our Proof-of-Work function from the classical one used in Bitcoin. In the second place, how secure is the light
bootstrapping in comparison with full validation?
4.2.1. Proof-of-Work Equivalence. We want to prove our RollerPow function could be used instead of BitcoinPow.
Below is the BitcoinPow function from [2] with respect to our definition of x argument and the only hashing function
hash to be used.
Algorithm 6 The Bitcoin’s proof of work function, parametrized by q,D. The input is (x; C).
1: function BITCOINPOW(x,C)
2: 〈aτ , aS , τ〉 ← x
3: if C = ε then
4: s← 0
5: else
6: 〈s′, a′τ , a
′
S , ctr
′〉 ← last(C)
7: s← hash(ctr′, hash(s′, a′τ , a
′
S))
8: end if
9: ctr← 1
10: B ← ε
11: h← hash(s, aτ , aS)
12: while (ctr ≤ q) do
13: if hash(ctr, h) < D then
14: B ← 〈s, x, ctr〉
15: break
16: end if
17: ctr ← ctr + 1
18: end while
19: C ← CB
20: return C
21: end function
For equivalence we prove that external party cannot distinguish by observing a fact of successful block generation
whether it is originated from RollerPow or BitcoinPow. We construct following indistinguishability experiment
POWA:
• There are two honest miners and an adversary. Miners are tossing a fair coin before the experiment. Based on
an uniform coin tossing outcome b, one of miners is trying to extend a Rollerchain-based blockchain, another
is working on a Bitcoin-based blockchain. The adversary doesn’t know about their jobs. Both miners share
the same q and D values.
• The adversary A generates two valid blockchains, one is Rollerchain and another is Bitcoin, and send both
chains to both miners.
• Both miners are calling their Proof-of-Work functions for an appropriate chain (ignoring another one). A miner
sends success if a new block has been successfully generated or failure if not, to the adversary. The answer is
to be sent not immediately, but just after fixed delay from getting a job Texp.
• Adversary outputs b′ and succeeds if b = b′. We write POWA = 1 if she succeeds, and POWA = 0 otherwise.
Assumption 2. It should be always possible to perform all the q iterations for both RollerPow and BitcoinPow
functions within Texp for any of the miners and for any input.
Theorem 1. For all the PPT adversary A, Pr[POWA = 1] = 12 .
Proof: For both Proof-of-Work functions hash(·) < D check is reached on each call. Let {0, 1}µ be the range
of hash(·) output, then both miners achieve success with the same probability p = D·q2µ . As the adversary does not
have an auxiliary information on which result was generated faster (it is probably from a Bitcoin miner), it cannot
distinguish with probability above the random guessing.
Note that without the Assumption 2 an adversary can try to generate so big state it is not possible anymore for a
RollerPow miner to call GenTicket q times. Then the miner calls GenTicket g < q times, her probability to succeed
becomes p = D·g2µ making possible for the adversary to improve her chance above
1
2 .
Corollary 1. Assume the GKL [2] environment described in the section 1.4 where miners are running whether
RollerPow or BitcoinPow function, and each miner can perform q iterations for any of both Proof-of-Work functions.
Also, the environment Z does not know which Proof-of-Work function actually being using (say, messages are
encrypted with a secret key the miners share). Then the environment can not distinguish which Proof-of-Work function
is used with a probability above the random guessing. That means all the analysis in the original work (which is
based on events probabilities analysis) could be reused.
4.2.2. Bootstrapping Security. Consider a new node is connecting to the network. Assume it connects to a large
number of nodes, so it sees last n state snapshots and full blocks. The node is going to download state snapshot
from n blocks ago and then apply the full blocks to it. How secure is the bootstrapping scenario in comparison
with a classic one where a full node is downloading and applying blocks since genesis? We introduce notions
of full verifier and light verifier and then prove the divergence in bootstrapping results for them is going down
exponentially with n.
Definition 2. A full verifier is a node which downloads all the full blocks since genesis.
Definition 3. A light verifier is a node downloading only block headers since genesis and then state snapshot from
n blocks ago and last n full blocks in order to apply the blocks to the state.
Theorem 2. Considering an authenticated dictionary second-preimage secure, a full verifier is getting the same
state for the same chain as the lite verifier with probability 1− negl(n).
Proof: Assume the chain has length h. If h ≤ n then the both verifiers are applying the same full blocks to
the same genesis state, and so get the same results with probability 1. Consider the case h > n. As authenticated
dictionary is second-preimage secure, a state a light verifier starts from is the same for both verifiers. By applying
n full blocks to it both verifiers is getting the same results if no fork deeper than n occurs (it is impossible to get a
state and blocks from deeper than n blocks ago for a light verifier so it will fail to construct the result). Assuming
the probability of such a fork is pf , verifiers are getting the same results with probability 1 − pf . Rollback for n
blocks means the common prefix property got broken. By Theorem 9 from [2] (we can use it due to the Corollary 1
result) the probability of that is at most e−Ω(δ3·n), δ ∈ (0, 1). Thus pf ≤ e−Ω(δ3·n) is negl(n) and both verifiers
are getting the same results with probability 1− negl(n).
However, a new node can start with a newer state than n blocks ago. But in case of a fork deeper than the state
she will need to download an older state.
4.3. The ε-consensus Attacks
To perform an ε-consensus attack [18] a miner includes heavy transactions into the block generated by herself
(for free) in order to force other miners to spend some time to verify a block or to skip validation. For our protocol
such attacks could be more harmful as a miner needs to apply at least k blocks, instead of just one. However,
a mining software could perform mining states updates in advance, in this case ε-consensus attacks are no more
harmful than in other systems.
4.4. Archiving Guarantees In Finite-Size Networks
Previously we stated that a very large network is storing last n state snapshots and full blocks. But real networks
are limited in size, and the size could be not so big. Consider Alice is joining a network holding a blockchain at
height hc and sees p peers, all of them are rational miners. How many versions of state, and also full blocks could
Alice find by asking her peers?
For simplicity, we ignore the fact that the ChooseSnapshots values unique for a peer. Then p peers have p · k
(possibly duplicate) values over n integer values. By using order statistics the expected minimum value is hmin =
(hc − n) +
n
p·k+1 = hc −
p·k·n
p·k+1 . Alice can download state snapshots and blocks since hmin on average from at
least one peer.
5. Related Work
5.1. The Permacoin Cryptocurrency
The key idea behind Permacoin [6] is to make the mining process dependent upon the storage resources rather
than the computational capabilities. In order to achieve the condition that every miner stores a random subset of a
known static dataset, Permacoin requires that the dataset is generated by a trusted dealer.
The trusted dealer also announces the root hash value of a Merkle tree [19] built on the top of the dataset. A
miner iterates over some random nonce value to find chunks whose indexes are dependent on the value. A ticket
contains the nonce value and the chunks with Merkle paths for them being attached.
The winning ticket gives the right to generate the next block to be included into the blockchain.
During careful analysis we have found few possible threats and open questions in the protocol:
• The Permacoin consensus requires a trusted dealer to encode a huge dataset and to build a Merkle tree on top
of it. We would like to eliminate the eliminate the need for a trusted dealer completely.
• The information a miner stores is static because it is a subset of a static dataset, thus it is possible to put it into a
dynamic or static RAM and then connect specialized hardware to the memory. With such a scheme companies
could get the same advantage over individual miners as in Bitcoin with the same degree of centralization we
would like to avoid.
• Identifiers of data segments to store depend on a miner’s public key. Possible identifier collisions are not
prohibited by the protocol. So a miner could iterate over private keys in order to find a public key maximizing
a number of the collisions (see “Setup” formula in “A simple POR lottery” figure of the Permacoin paper [6]).
This could give even more advantage to a company with vast computational resources over individual miners.
5.2. Ethereum
Ethereum [12] has state representation as an authenticated data structure being fixed by the protocol with a root
hash to be included into a block. However, as there is no incentive to store past state snapshots, the state proof in
a block header is useful mostly to help light clients to get the state elements from the full nodes along with the
authenticity proofs and does not solve the rationale problem stated in the Section 1.2.
Ethereum is contending with specialized hardware by using Ethash algorithm, which is proposing to use pseudo-
random dataset generated from blockheaders in the past in a Proof-of-Work mining process. The usefulness of
EthHash is the same as of the Bitcoin scheme. The disadvantage of the algorithm is a heavy validation process.
5.3. Cryptonite
Cryptonite [20] utilizes mini-blockchain scheme [21] to prune full blocks before a constant numbers of last ones,
thus having a proof chain of length hpc (the chain of block headers only), a state for a height hpc and full blocks
for heights from hpc + 1 till current. It is not clear from the paper [21] how the protocol enforces this scheme.
6. Further Work
We highlight some unsolved problems and questions to be answered before a deploy to a real-life system.
6.1. Compress Block Headers Storage
It is probably possible to reduce number of block headers stored at a full node by using Proofs-of-Proof-of-Work
with sublinear complexity technique from [22]. However, the technique should be developed further with respect
to dynamic nature of the difficulty parameter.
6.2. Protection Against Specialized Hardware
As a set of states needed for mining is dynamic, it is probably more protected from specialized hardware than
Permacoin. For better protection asymmetric Proof-of-Work based on the Generalized Birthday problem [23] could
be incorporated into our protocol. Protection against specialized hardware is needed to prevent a situation when
only few parties hold state snapshots and full blocks and so should be considered carefully.
6.3. A State Exchange Protocol
Consider Alice joining a network. She chooses a state snapshot at height hd to download from her peers. The
problem is, if a new block arrives during downloading the snapshot, her peers are to replace the snapshot with
another one of height hd + 1. To avoid this problem Alice needs to ask her peers to store the snapshot even if it
is not needed for mining anymore. Alice can propose a reward to her peers for doing this, thus some fair protocol
is needed.
6.4. Implementation Parameters and Details
Archiving parameters n and k should be carefully chosen in practice. Also, an authenticated dictionary
implementation must have efficient batch updates in order to minimize computational overhead for re-calculating
authenticating value during a block application.
7. Conclusion
We argue Bitcoin as well as other blockchain systems are secure in some aspects because of altruistic behavior
of participants, and the cost of the altruism is going up with time. As we cannot expect such a status quo to be
viable in the long term, the question of a blockchain system safe in the presence of rational super-majority arises.
In particular we need to protect blockchain systems against a long-term threat of full blocks pruning. A rational
full node prunes its full blocks, but if all the nodes are rational then a new node can not bootstrap in a trustless
manner.
We have presented a modification for a Proof-of-Work blockchain system to repurpose the work securing in order
to store a fixed number of state snapshots and full blocks collectively. Or result is generic so could be applied to
many blockchain systems with different transactional semantics. We have carefully described changes needed to be
applied to transactional layer of a blockchain system and a modified Proof-of-Work scheme.
Together this twofold contribution, the Rollerchain framework, allows full nodes to be rational without a security
loss for a network. A rational full node implementation can reduce its storage requirements by three orders of
magnitude in comparison with an altruistic one, and a new node still can bootstrap in a trustless, quick and safe
way.
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